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
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
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Chinese Affairs

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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They should be directed to the officers named in the individual articles.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence

CHINESE AFFAIRS

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The Politics of Agriculture

The Chinese, who have not been insisting on rigid formulas in the face of diminishing agricultural returns, have recently been paying unusual attention to farm production. The note of concern and practicality that runs through articles and broadcasts preceding the spring planting can be attributed to last year's disappointing harvest. Much of the problem was simply the natural calamities that hit most of Asia, but the Chinese are also hinting that mismanagement and inefficiency were partially at fault. Still, no scapegoats have been singled out, and cadres have been warned not to blame agricultural shortcomings on the "swindlers" who get blamed for most other problems.

A report on agriculture given to the Hupeh Provincial Party Committee by its first secretary typifies the increased emphasis on agriculture. In the past, the provinces have been content to rely on verbal exhortation. This year, Hupen not only plans to send an unusually high-level group of cadres to rural areas to ensure vigorous spring farming efforts, but also calls for the reduction of study meetings, increased technological training, and the rehabilitation of veteran cadre.

It is inconceivable that Hupeh would dare to espouse such sensitive policies without the prior approval of Peking. Other provinces have made similar statements, although not in such detail or at such length. The February issue of *Red Flag*, the frequently pedantic party theoretical journal, weighed in with an article on the subject. Unlike most *Red Flag* articles, which are graced with seemingly endless paragraphs of esoteric ideological argument, this piece was conspicuous for its straightforward, practical approach to farming. The article carries weight because its author is the party secretary of Tachai production brigade, the national agricultural model.

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A number of factors will, of course, influence the harvest. Chinese investment in agriculture apparently is increasing, but its effect will not be very noticeable this year. More important for a good harvest will be the successful implementation of the more moderate approach to agriculture. These policies have been popular with the peasants, but occasionally have been politically dangerous for the cadre who must enforce them. Peking broadcasts indicate that the central leadership is making some attempt to calm the justifiably nervous officials and assure them that they run no risk by pushing current policies. Still, the most important influence on the harvest is likely to be Mother Nature. [REDACTED]

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Ho Tam's Travels

After having spent the 9-14 February period in Peking, North Korean Foreign Minister Ho Tam stopped there again on 20-21 February en route home from Pakistan. While he only stayed overnight, he was treated very warmly and was again received by Chou En-lai; this despite the fact that he had seen Chou only the week before and that a reception by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei would have met all protocol requirements.

There is little doubt that Chou's gesture was made in the hope of assuaging to some extent Ho Tam's ruffled feelings. He had come to Peking in an effort to obtain stronger backing for North Korea's intensified propaganda effort to label the presence of US forces in South Korea the "sole" obstacle to Korean unification. He received nothing of the kind. In fact, the joint communique issued at the conclusion of his initial visit was extremely bland and contained only the most pro forma demands for US withdrawal. Moreover, after the initial visit NCNA singled out Seoul rather than Washington as the root cause of blocked progress. NCNA went so far as to paraphrase Pyongyang's harsh anti-US statements, but substituted "South Korea" for "US."

Since the Tam trips were just prior to and during the visit of Dr. Kissinger to Peking, Peking's behavior toward the North Korean foreign minister was a not too subtle reminder of how highly the Chinese value their developing relationship with the US. Indeed, the Chinese are probably counseling the North Koreans to pursue with patience a policy of moderation, while improving Sino-US relations and the winding down of the US military involvement in Indochina contribute

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[redacted]

to a decrease in tension throughout Asia. As this occurs, the Chinese probably argue, a decrease in US forces in the area will follow. Until such time the Chinese are taking a very relaxed attitude toward the presence of US forces in Korea, to the apparent chagrin of Pyongyang.

The Chinese can also argue that US troops in South Korea are there as part of a "containment" of China that might be considered irrelevant in Washington in the current context. Peking's diplomacy, the argument runs, may be able to get the troops removed; Moscow does not have this card to play. So long as this remains so, China can afford to snub the Koreans occasionally. Such discord between the Chinese and North Koreans is at most relatively minor in a relationship that has in fact become closer over the past year. [redacted]

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Who Commands the PLA?

A contradiction has developed in Chinese domestic propaganda over the question of who is to be portrayed as the head of the Peoples Liberation Army. One version describes the PLA as "founded and led by our great leader Chairman Mao," while the second adds to that "and the Chinese Communist Party." The evolution of the who-commands-the-army question strongly suggests that these phrases reflect a sensitive political issue.

Before the purge of former defense minister Lin Piao, the PLA was routinely described as founded and led by Mao and directly commanded by Lin. After Lin's removal, the PLA was "founded and commanded" by Mao. This formulation prevailed until Army Day 1972, when the joint editorial and de facto defense minister Yeh Chien-ying's speech both added the phrase "and the CCP." This usage has been generally applied ever since. A number of provinces have, on occasion, fallen back to describing the PLA as commanded by Mao alone, but most follow the "Mao and the CCP" model.

This formulation appears to be part of a deliberate diminution of the Chairman's public eminence. In the ideological sphere, the phrase "Mao Tse-tung Thought" is frequently replaced by "Marxist-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought." Likewise, once singular references to Mao now often take the form of "Mao and the CCP," or "Mao and the Party Center."

While the shift is in keeping with an emphasis on collective leadership and serves to prepare the way for a China after Mao, it may also be a manifestation of the behind-the-scenes political struggle in Peking. Official documents detailing Lin Piao's alleged crimes make the point that the old formulation describing the PLA as led by Mao but directly

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commanded by Lin was a weapon in the former defense minister's effort to consolidate his power; indeed, Mao himself, in the course of one of his speeches in the summer of 1971, refers to this phrase as a Lin maneuver. Thus, while it is unlikely that anyone would be foolhardy enough to attack the Chairman directly, the addition of the clause "and the CCP" could mean that some leaders at the center may be using a similar tack to deflate Mao's public image as a means of reducing his still considerable political authority. [REDACTED]

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The "Year of Europe"

China's strong interest in Western European affairs was again demonstrated last week. NCNA enthusiastically praised President Nixon's statement that 1973 will be the "year of Europe" for US policy, noting the President had also said that Washington would continue to place "enormous emphasis" on Asian affairs, including the dialogue with China.

Peking continued its efforts to expand trade ties with Western Europe. Three fertilizer plants with a total value of over \$30 million were purchased by the Chinese from a Dutch-based engineering firm

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Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei arrived in Paris on 26 February, the first time a Chinese Communist foreign minister has ever visited Europe.

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Over the past year the Chinese have devoted an increasing amount of their diplomatic energies to West European affairs. Not only are they seeking to re-establish normal relations there, but they are also alarmed at the trend toward further detente in Europe, especially by the prospects for the conference on European security which Peking sees as a Soviet plot. The Chinese believe that any further relaxation of West Europe's guard against Moscow will give the Soviets a freer hand on the Eastern front. In this context, Peking would like to see Washington place renewed emphasis on the US role in Europe, particularly its role as the dominant power in NATO, and the NCNA headlines on a "Year of Europe" are clearly a reflection of this desire.

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When Left is Right and Right is Wrong

More confusion has been added to the protracted campaign to criticize Lin Piao. After denouncing him for over a year as an ultra-leftist, the party now claims that Lin was not an ultra-leftist but an "ultra-rightist." The term first appeared around the end of the year, but [] the anti-Lin campaign in Peking still charges Lin with being an ultra-leftist.

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A flurry of provincial broadcasts, probably guidance from Peking, says it is wrong to regard Lin's crimes as ultra-leftist. The broadcasts confess that Lin not only appeared to be an ultra-leftist "on some issues and at some times," but occasionally did carry out an ultra-leftist line. A recent broadcast from Szechwan explained that "the true nature of this line is ultra-rightist, not ultra-leftist." The basic reason for this confusion is that official charges against Lin cover the entire political spectrum, linking him with the rightist "revisionist" policies of Liu Shao-chi (many of which are back in vogue today), as well as blaming him for the radical excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

Official charges aside, Lin's record put him solidly in the leftist camp. The denials in the media of his ultra-leftism and the emphasis on his so-called "rightist" crimes seem designed to take the heat off the leftists. While this could be a conciliatory gesture by the moderates, the new line is more likely the work of those closely associated with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, possibly under the direction of party propagandist Yao Wen-yuan. The campaign against ultra-rightists is accompanied by a new, more defensive line on the Cultural Revolution. Several radio broadcasts have called for

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"defending and developing the great fruits" of the Cultural Revolution and have repeated an old Mao quote, resurrected in the New Year editorial, justifying the Cultural Revolution as "completely necessary and extremely timely." Even in the palmy days of 1966-67, this phrase had a distinctly defensive ring. The present propaganda initiative seems to be a rear-guard action on the part of those who may be afraid they will be tarred with the same brush Lin was. In any event, it is not likely to cause major reversals.

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Zayyat's Coming

The Chinese will play host to Egyptian Foreign Minister Zayyat starting March 11. The visit is the first by a high-ranking Egyptian official since President Sadat's ouster of the Soviet military mission last July. The Chinese, who welcomed Sadat's move, have proceeded cautiously since then in exploiting Moscow's loss. In large part this caution probably reflects Peking's realization that it is incapable of replacing the USSR as Egypt's benefactor. Chinese leaders quickly congratulated Sadat on his defense of Egyptian national sovereignty, but by just as quickly bemoaning China's own economic underdevelopment, Peking officials from Chou En-lai on down impressed upon the Egyptians that Peking's ability to aid them materially is very limited. An exchange of visits by Chinese and Egyptian industrial experts in August and December 1972 suggests that at most some of the \$65 million in credits left over from earlier loans may be released to help the Egyptians develop light industry.

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Nevertheless, the Chinese are interested in maintaining a dialogue with Cairo as part of their effort to combat Soviet influence. As reported in the Cairo press, Chou's remarks to Cairo journalist Muhammad Heykal last month added up to a severe critique of Soviet policy in the Middle East. For example, Chou told Heykal that on Middle Eastern matters, Brezhnev was even weaker than Khrushchev had been in 1967. Brezhnev, Chou said, faces the US as a mouse faces a cat.

Chou also dropped several remarks on the general Middle East situation. Reiterating China's support

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for the Arabs, Chou agreed with Heykal that a political solution would involve the element of force. Chou's remarks were matter of fact, however, and did not appear to encourage Arab bellicosity. Rather, his heavy stress on the necessity for a strong, united home front in Egypt carried with it the implication that, before embarking on further efforts against Israel, Egypt must put its own house in order and work for Arab unity. This advice, which would preclude Arab military action for the time being, echoes counsel of Vice Foreign Minister Ho Ying in December 1972 that Egypt should accompany its preparation for battle "by serious action in the political and diplomatic fields." In fact, the Chinese, who can read a travel itinerary as well as the next man, recognize that the recent trips of prominent Arabs to Moscow and Washington--not to mention Mrs. Meir's visit last week--may presage a new diplomatic attempt to move the Middle East problems off dead center. While China will to a large degree be on the outside looking in, Peking obviously would like to dance, even for a few bars, in this elaborate minuet that may shortly begin.

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New Emphasis on Expertise

The recent broadcast of two *People's Daily* articles by Radio Peking indicates that the Chinese are contemplating a return to factory management techniques used before the Cultural Revolution. The articles convey this idea by praising management practices initiated by the party committee of Talian Steel Mill--a model unit whose name lends authority to the changes. According to *People's Daily*, the reduction was accomplished by sending ordinary workers back to production tasks while retaining "indispensable specialist management personnel." Moreover, the paper attributed the mill's increased production to appointing people with "higher consciousness, greater dynamism, and richer experience... to leading and directing posts." By and large, these persons seem to be the once-disgraced veteran managers.

Over-reliance on expertise was severely criticized during the Cultural Revolution. The economic planners in Peking may view a return to skilled management as a means of overcoming inefficiency. The planners may be only partially correct in their belief that by enhancing the authority of management specialists most of the bottlenecks can be removed, but the increased emphasis on skills and experienced personnel will make possible a freer, less dogmatic approach to management.

It is unlikely, however, that the new freedom will be fully exercised as long as the average official remains uncertain about the life of the policy. He knows too well its past history, and as long as the political situation in Peking remains unsettled, the central government will have difficulty getting him to implement purge-prone programs with vigor.

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CHRONOLOGY

- 15 February: Joint communique issued by China and North Korea following visit of North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Ho Tam.
- 15-18 February: Dr. Kissinger and party visit Peking-- Kissinger received by Chairman Mao Tse-tung on 17 February. Chinese media give broad coverage to visit and project optimistic view of Sino-US relations.
- 16 February: 1973 Sino-Guinean trade agreement signed in Conakry.
- NCNA headlines President Nixon's remarks to NATO Supreme Commander that 1973 will be "the Year of Europe" for US policy.
- 17-22 February: Madame Bhutto visits China to celebrate first Pakistan International Airlines flight to Peking and is received by Premier Chou En-lai.
- 18 February: Visiting Japanese trade delegation received by Minister of Foreign Trade Pai Hsiang-kuo.
- 19 February: Stop-over visit of DRV and PRG representatives en route to Paris International Conference on Vietnam. Received by Chou En-lai and Chi Peng-fei.
- Formation in Shanghai of the first province-level Young Communist League committee since the Cultural Revolution; committee officially endorsed by *People's Daily* on 22 February.

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20 February: Charge d'affaires Kao O arrives to open Chinese Embassy in Dahomey.

Sino-Ethiopian protocol signed covering economic aid projects under the 197 Chinese loan.

20-21 February: Ho Tam returns to Peking en route home from Pakistan and is received again by Chou En-lai.

21 February: Talks on possible long-term contract for the sale of Chinese crude oil to Tokyo broken off. Japanese officials are optimistic that talks will be resumed.

21-22 February: Ethiopian Airlines starts service to China. Wang Shih-yen heads Chinese friendship delegation arriving in Addis Ababa on 23 February return flight.

22 February: Joint US-PRC communique issued re-affirming the principles of the Shanghai Communique and agreeing to establish "liaison offices" in Peking and Washington.

23 February: PRC technicians depart Hong Kong for training at Boeing plant in Seattle.

24 February: Chinese delegation arrives in Ecuador for trade negotiations.

25 February: Chinese delegation to the International Conference on Vietnam, headed by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, arrives in Paris. The following day Chi strongly endorses the agreement.

Chou En-lai says he expects heads of the Peking and Washington liaison offices will be of ambassadorial rank.

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Tung Pi-Wu, acting chairman of the PRC, and Chou En-lai send messages to the King of Laos and Prince Souphanouvong congratulating them on the signing of the Laos cease-fire agreement.

26 February: Charge d'affaires Chu Chi-chon leaves Peking to open PRC embassy in Australia.

1 March: China marks anniversary of 1947 uprising on Taiwan for the first time since 1965. Fu Tso-i calls for negotiations to arrange reunification of Taiwan with the mainland or informal contacts if the GRC is not ready for formal negotiations.

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ANNEXA Succession Preview: Who's Who

The downfall of Mao's chosen heir Lin Biao in September 1971 reopened the succession question. Since that time, the leadership has been pondering the transfer of authority upon the death of China's aging leaders--particularly party Chairman Mao Tse-tung, 79, and Premier Chou En-lai, 74--and has shown interest in bringing younger party members into the leadership. The succession question has become a favorite topic of conversation among Chinese at every level and is even raised with foreign visitors.

As matters stand now, the sudden departure of either Mao or Chou would probably not cause widespread or prolonged turmoil. Mao's death could actually smooth the way for an easy transition

Before the Cultural Revolution, there were four vice chairmen, but at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, Lin was named the sole vice chairman. As a result the party is now without a vice chairman. The selection of a vice chairman will be one of the first orders of business at the Tenth Party Congress. Unless the congress opts for a "collective leadership"--much discussed since Lin's departure--the person chosen will replace Mao as head of the party. In the meantime, Mao still must approve all major personnel appointments, and getting his agreement on a slate of candidates, particularly on possible vice-chairmen, is probably one of the problems holding up the party congress.

If Mao should die before a tenth congress is convened, the whole process of personnel selection

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could well be greatly facilitated. The congress probably would be called soon after his death. The leadership might choose to elevate one of the non-controversial honorary elders on the current Politburo, possibly old marshal Chu Teh, to act as temporary chairman. Something similar was done a year ago when the 87-year-old Tung Pi-wu was named acting head of state. With Chu in the chair, the day-to-day affairs of the party would probably be overseen by a group including Chou En-lai and possibly Shanghai party boss Chang Chun-chiao and the de facto defense minister, Yeh Chien-ying.

If Mao Dies First

If Premier Chou were to outlive Mao, it would probably make little difference, over the short run at least, who succeeds Mao as party chairman. The major burden of running the country has been on Chou's shoulders since, and even during the Cultural Revolution. After Mao's death, China would continue along the course Chou has set, and it might well move faster.

Chou himself is likely to shun the party chairmanship, although presumably he could have it, if he so desired. The Premier is an administrator, not a theoretician, and is perfectly suited to keep the machinery of government running smoothly. He has an almost endless capacity for work, carrying a load which would stagger many a younger man. Chou has never shown any particular interest in being party chairman, and that is probably one reason he continues to be trusted by Mao, who has disposed of many other comrades. After Mao is gone, Chou might well prefer to be the power behind the throne than to occupy it himself.

If he does not take the job, Chou certainly will have a large say in the selection of the man who does. The name that crops up most often is Chang Chun-chiao. Given the current make-up of the Politburo, Chang is

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[redacted]

a logical choice. Apart from Mao and Chou, most of the ten members are either "honorary elders" or military men. Li Hsien-nien is a government specialist whose forte is administration rather than politics. The remaining three are Chang, Chiang Ching (Mao's wife), and the young Shanghai radical, Yao Wen-yuan. Of these, Chang is clearly the best candidate on the basis of experience and probable acceptability to the other members. This process of elimination among lower ranking cadres may account for the number of reports about Chang's favorable prospects.

Chang, a leading radical during the Cultural Revolution, owes his position to the support of Mao and Chiang Ching. Nevertheless, he is astute enough to compromise when he has to, and with an eye toward his post-Mao future, it is possible he has taken steps to make himself acceptable to moderates like Chou. It is doubtful that he is one of Chou's "trusted lieutenants," [redacted] but Chang seems certain to figure prominently in the post-Mao party. The radical wing of the party will continue to exist long after Mao's death, its views will have to be represented, and Chang is the least controversial of those Politburo members closely associated with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution--more acceptable by far than either Chiang Ching or Yao Wen-yuan.

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Although Chiang Ching's role has been largely restricted to cultural affairs, a move seems to be under way to pre-empt her leadership in that politically sensitive field. This has probably been motivated by a desire to minimize her potential as a political force when Mao passes from the scene. As Mao's wife, she can not be removed until after his death. [redacted] she is offensive to the leadership in the provinces; this distaste probably applies to Yao Wen-yuan as well. Yao's blistering attacks during the Cultural Revolution did not endear him to the moderates. Although

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he is currently in charge of party propaganda work, Yao owes his Politburo position solely to his close association with Mao and Chiang China. [REDACTED]

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Candidates for the chairmanship will not be limited to the current Politburo. The Tenth Party Congress, whether it occurs before or after Mao's death, will bring some new faces onto that under-strength body. Even if Chou should choose to act as a regent to the new chairman, he would probably wish to call on experienced party officials to rebuild the party, because he has not in the past devoted as much attention to party affairs as to government matters.

From Chou's point of view the reinstatement of some pre-Cultural Revolution party leaders to their former Politburo rank probably is highly desirable. (He has done much the same in the government bureaucracy.) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] How many and who should be reinstated may well be subjects of fierce debate; in addition, there are those within the leadership who oppose any move along these lines.

Over the short term, the new party chairman could find himself in a weak position. Wholesale damage was done to the party during the Cultural Revolution, and it has yet to regain its pre-eminence. Mao's still-considerable influence derives not from his position as head of the party, but from his great prestige and popular appeal. The next chairman will not enjoy the latter advantages and will find, as has Mao, that the only institution left with the strength and authority to get things done is the military. While many military leaders in the provinces

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double as provincial party chiefs, their influence derives from the troops they command. The military is the largest and most important interest group in the party. As such, it cannot easily be divested of its party role. Military men will remain a significant political force well after Mao's death, and any party leader with political ambitions would be well advised to court them.

A strong voice will be that of Li Te-sheng, an alternate member of the Politburo, who holds a key post in the central military hierarchy as director of the army's General Political Department. He may be in line for the job of chief of staff, which has been vacant since the Lin affair, and he seems almost certain of promotion to full membership on the Politburo at the Tenth Party Congress.

The new party chairman will also have to establish a sound working relationship with the provincial military leaders. Chou apparently enjoys the support, if not the full trust and confidence, of the moderate military leaders, but the military establishment is uneasy about the drive to reassert the primacy of the party. On the one hand, Chou has gone out of his way to calm their fears and has spoken on their behalf in Peking. On the other hand, he is sensitive to criticism of the military's dominant role in the regime and would like to re-establish some measure of party control over the army. Military leaders probably recognize that they need Chou as much as he needs them. They have worked well with him since the Cultural Revolution and would probably transfer their cooperation to a party chairman endorsed by Chou.

To the masses, Mao's death would probably not be as traumatic today as at the height of his personality cult. The cult has been diminishing in recent years, and Mao's image was badly tarnished in the Lin Piao affair. While he is still loved by many, there are probably more people than ever before who

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look at Mao critically. Chou commands wide respect throughout the country, and so long as the country has such a leader to turn to, Mao's death will probably not be especially disruptive.

Mao's death would leave Chou the single most important figure in the country. With no visible challengers to his authority and relieved of the need to secure Mao's approval, Chou would have a freer hand to direct party and government affairs. He would still have to accommodate a variety of interests, but his powers of persuasion and his considerable prestige would enable him to forge a workable coalition out of the disparate groups at the top, much as he frequently did at lower levels during the Cultural Revolution.

If Chou Dies First

Should Chou die first, the situation would be much less clear. Mao has associated himself with many of the current moderate Chinese policies, particularly in the field of foreign affairs, that are identified with Chou. Without Chou, a turn to the left could well occur. For example, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan might be given added responsibilities, and plans to reinstate former party leaders (many of them the very people Mao removed during the Cultural Revolution) might be halted. The Chairman is on record as saying that the country ought to have a new Cultural Revolution every few years, but he probably would not launch another one like the last. Even if he should want to, it is unlikely that he could call out either youth or the army as he did in the 1960s, and the party as it is now constituted would be an even less reliable instrument of his will.

The most immediate problem posed by Chou's death would be the selection of a new premier. The nod almost certainly would go to Li Hsien-nien, the only active vice premier and the only government official

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with Politburo rank, a prerequisite for the head of government. Li is close to Chou and holds many of the same views, but he may lack Chou's political skills and, especially, Chou's influence with Mao. It is not likely that Li, who is in his mid sixties, would have the political weight to name a like-minded successor.

Chou and Li appear to be grooming a number of younger government officials for high posts. Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua is certainly among them, as is Pai Hsiang-kuo, a military man until 1970, who has turned in an outstanding performance as minister of foreign trade. Most of these second-echelon government bureaucrats are not even members of the party Central Committee, however, and unless they attain that status, they will find it difficult to reach the first echelon. Chou presumably will sponsor some of these people for membership on the Central Committee, if not the Politburo, at the Tenth Party Congress, but if he should die before the congress, their promotions would be in doubt.

Chang Chun-chiao has frequently been mentioned in speculation about future premiers, but his future is likely to be much brighter within the party hierarchy than in the government. Although theoretically he is in charge of China's largest city, Shanghai--a job which could give him vast administrative experience--Chang has lived in Peking since 1969, attending to his Politburo duties and making only brief periodic visits to Shanghai. His only foray into the administrative field was in 1970, when he headed a health campaign in 13 provinces; the campaign was a flop.

A more likely long range prospect is alternate Politburo member Chi Teng-kuei. Chi, in his early forties, appears to handle agricultural matters for the party. His ideological predilections are unknown, but he rose to prominence during the Cultural Revolution and may be associated with the party's radical

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wing. Most of these people, with the probable exception of Chang Chun-chiao, will play important roles in the post-Chou government, but Mao will choose who becomes premier.

It will be more difficult to replace Chou as the chief spokesman for the moderates, than as premier. Moderate members of the leadership would be hard pressed to find another champion who carries as much weight with Mao. Initially, because so many of them are military men, they would probably turn to Yeh Chien-ying. Yeh, too, is in his seventies and would be no more than a temporary successor. Either of the two regional military commanders now on the Politburo conceivably could lead the moderate cause, but both of them seem content to remain in their home provinces away from the political fray in Peking.

Chou's death would cause considerable anxiety, both within the leadership and among the people, since he is considered by many as virtually indispensable. If Chou should die before he has been able, via the Tenth Party Congress, to give those he trusts sufficient stature within the party to play a major role, these anxieties would be well founded. The best hope for China, then, is for Mao to die first.

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